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•How we are collaborating now
•Benefits from more data collaboration
•Opportunities for data collaboration
•How can we share data?
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GPM/DPR – NASA/JAXA
ExoMars/MOMA – ESA/NASA SOC/ SoloHI, HIS – ESA/NASA
XRISM/RESOLVE –
JAXA/NASA
JWST/MIRI, NIRSpec – NASA/ESA
Collaboration o rn Mlissiams 
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Benefits:
• More accurate reliability prediction 
given the on-orbit and test history
• With an updated reliability 
prediction, the design be changed 
without assuming more risk, e.g. 
by removing redundancy 
• Supports Mission Extension and 
Post Mission Disposal studies
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Discoveries:
• The product is already qualified, 
and the margins are known
• The manufacturer uses well-
established and proven 
procedures
• Oversight / insight that is  
needed with certain products / 
manufacturers (mandatory 
inspection points)
Benefits:
• Pre-emptive process gap 
analysis and acceptance
• Leverage community 
process lessons learned
• Leverage manufacturer  
data already gathered
• Flexibility and tailoring of  
QA requirements for 
mission
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Benefits:
• Consistency in hazard mitigation 
approach
 Understanding of definitions of keep-
out zones
• Continuous improvement in 
hazard mitigation
• Share understanding how to 
entice manufacturers to implement 
recommended hazard mitigations
• Possibly reduce safety incidents
Test Title: Spacecraft BattezyMaintenance SOP 
O&SHA Summary: 
Ha zards H a.za11d Coutrnls 
Cell ve.nt Warning: During Battery 1 
charge, if any individual cell 
voltage exceeds 4.2 volts, or if 
the EGSE fails to automatically 
terminate the charge, the opera.tor 
shall manually terminate the 
charge by selecting the EPO 
sv,,itch. Excessive voltage may 
lead to a runaway condition 
resulting in the Battery "venting 
with flame" _ 
Warning: During Battery 2 
charge, if any individual cell 
voltage exceeds 4.2, olts, or if 
the EGSE fails to automatically 
terminate the charge, the operator 
shall manually terminate the 
charge by selecting the EPO 
switch. Excessive voltage may 
lead to a runaway condition 
resulting in the Battery <•venting 
with flame" _ 
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Revision: C 
Comm E.>uts 
Before battery 1 charge 
Before battery 2 charge 
Provides safety check of 
planned operations and 
BCDA performance 
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Benefits:
• Recommendations 
for future missions 
based on flight 
history
Changes in design
Operational 
Preparedness
Operations Lessons Learned 
;;;;;;;; Goddard Space Flig ht Center 
Mission Anomaly Description(s) Potential Lesson(s) Learned Recommendation(s) 
MISSION-A STEREO-AHEAD experienced an autonomous Missions need to use proven Since many newer spacecraft are 
Inertia l Reference Unit (IRU) switch to backup methods for solving gyro equipped with two IRUs, and older 
from primary, due to a IRU fai lure indication in issues/failures, regardless of missions are experiencing longevity 
the built-in test (BIT) fi rmware. SOAR #S- manufacturer and gyro type. problems with their IRUs, future missions 
MISSION-A-000R (including MISSION-I and MISSION-J) 
Depending on the spacecraft, known should verify that a plan for gyro 
MISSION-D MISSION-B, -C, and -D; MISSION-E; and other failure solutions include: contingencies is in place prior to launch. 
MISSION-C spacecraft reported numerous Inertial - Redundancy 
MISSION-B Reference Unit (IRU) anomalies. After loss of (MISSION-A, MISSION-F) A Gold Rule shou ld be formulated for 
redundancy, MISSION-C is maintaining - Replacement developing gyroless/reduced gyro attitude 
attitude control by operating in Reduced Gyro (MISSION-F) control fl ight software as a contingency 
Mode with one gyroscope, while MISSION-B - Gyroless/reduced gyro attitude plan, despite the extra cost and effort. 
and MISSION-D are operating nominally with control fl ight software - Prepare this software pre-launch. 
two gyroscopes. SOAR #S-MISSION-D-000U, (MISSION-C, MISSION-F, - Changing software without introducing 
#S-MISSJON-C-000T, #S-MISSJON-B-000S, MISSION-G, MISSION-H) errors or undesired behavior is much 
and orhers - Star trackers more difficult than bu ilding correct 
- Guide telescope. software initially. 
- Don't be forced to modify software 
during a crisis. 
- Be sure al l flight software is adequately 
tested and reviewed. 
Refer to the rationale of GSFC-STD-1000 
Ru le 3.09, "Software Development 
Approach ." 
Continue further analysis to identify gyro 
fatigue indicators, and assist missions to 
more easily forecast future issues. 
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Benefits:
• Higher confidence in risk 
assessments, e.g. 
performed by Failure 
Review Boards and 
Material Review Boards
• Better mitigation strategies
• Better Inherited Item Risk 
Assessments
Risk 
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Risk
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Unknowns Knowns
Knowns
Unknowns
Benefits:
• Shifts emphasis from requirements compliance to 
risk acceptance of proven non-compliant product 
and allows for SMA requirements tailoring
• Might provide relief from SMA requirements 
compliance such as 
 waiver process, 
 EEE parts or materials board review, 
 mandatory inspection points, 
 submission of reliability analyses reports, thus saving resources
• Decreases risk posture by accepting the current 
non-compliant but “proven” version vs requiring 
change in manufacturing
Inherited Item ~ is~ ~ ssessllilemts 
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• Observatory Configuration (high level – with 
Standard Component manufacturer’s model / 
part number / options
• Ground Testing and Anomalies 
(including root causes / 
mitigations)
• Observatory Space Environment • Mishaps / Close Calls
• On-orbit usage of spacecraft Standard 
Components with successful operating hours or 
failures
 Launch date, redundancy configuration and duty cycle
• Materials Usage and 
Identification List / Materials 
Usage Agreements
• EEE parts list
• Standard Component Lineage and changes
 Extent of modification of used part to commercially offered 
part
• Manufacturing Processes
Opportunities for Data Collaboration 
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• How do agencies collect historic mission information?
• How do we ensure that the data is reaching the people it is of value to?
• How do we ensure data security and asset protection?
• How do we handle technology transfers?
• How do we ensure data is understandable?
• What should the mechanisms for sharing be? (Push or pull?)
• Should each agency have a POC for Data Sharing 
 For data requests?
 For data dissemination?
• Should we establish ways of providing feedback to manufacturers 
consistently?
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